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The impact of the global financial crisis on the  
Philippine financial system – an assessment 
Diwa C Guinigundo
1 
“The problem in politics is this: you don’t get any credit for disasters averted.” 
Henry M Paulson Jr, Former US Treasury Secretary 
I.   Introduction 
The crisis that originated from the US subprime mortgage market escalated into a global 
phenomenon. Earlier debates on “decoupling”
2 died down as the crisis’ contagion effects 
proved headstrong, cascading to the financial markets of advanced and emerging economies 
and unleashing a full-blown systemic crisis. Aside from causing huge wealth destruction, this 
development eroded confidence in financial institutions and markets worldwide, causing 
intensified concerns over liquidity, as well as a plethora of bankruptcies, forced mergers and 
massive monetary intervention from financial authorities, thereby leading to a drastically 
reshaped financial landscape.
3  
Nonetheless, East Asia in particular was in a much better position to weather a financial 
crisis compared to a decade ago. At the time of the crisis until today, its economic 
fundamentals have been generally stronger. Banking systems in the region have, in general, 
become more resilient, sound and stable. The region has accumulated high levels of foreign 
reserves that have also helped it to absorb shocks well. The adoption of conservative 
financial policies has paid off. In addition, regional economic integration and open global 
markets have expanded and deepened East Asia’s production networks and export 
markets.
4  
In the case of the Philippines, the conservative attitude of Philippine banks led to only 
marginal exposure to derivatives/structured products. Adequate information disclosure 
practices and the implementation of banking reforms are now yielding fruit, particularly in 
terms of better risk management and consolidated supervision. These have contributed to 
the limited impact of the crisis on Philippine financial markets. 
This paper examines the extent of the impact of the financial crisis on emerging Asia’s 
financial system, namely the equity markets, bond market, foreign exchange market, money 
market, and the banking sector, with a focus on the Philippines. The paper also analyses the 
Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas’ (BSP) responses to the challenges that emerged as a result of 
the recent global financial turmoil.  
                                                  
1   Deputy Governor, Monetary Stability Sector, Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas. 
2   At the onset of the crisis, many believed that emerging market economies would avoid the negative spillovers 
of the US subprime fallout as they had already broadened and deepened to the point where they were less 
dependent on the United States and other advanced economies. (27 January 2008: “Decoupling: theory vs 
reality”, International Herald Tribune.) 
3    Loser, C M (2009): “Global financial turmoil and emerging market economies: a major contagion and a 
shocking loss of wealth?”, Asian Development Bank. 
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II.   Spillover effects in emerging Asia 
Although emerging Asia has not been at the core of the crisis, negative developments in the 
global financial and macroeconomic environment spilled over to the region. This was 
primarily due to Asia’s greater market integration with the rest of the world, which necessarily 
amplified the magnitude of the cross-country transmission of shocks.
5  
While financial markets in emerging Asia had relatively limited exposure to subprime-related 
instruments, increased global market integration meant that the deleveraging process in 
advanced economies led to a substantial liquidation of assets in emerging Asian markets and 
large capital outflows. These developments, in turn, contributed to a sharp decline in the 
Asian equity markets, the widening of sovereign bond spreads, the depreciation of regional 
exchange rates and the decline in offshore bank lending in the region.
6  
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1 Morgan Stanley Capital International equity indices; total return indices.    
2  JPMorgan EMBI Global (EMBIG) sovereign spreads over 
US Treasury yields (for Korea and Thailand, CMA five-year credit default swap premia), in basis points.    
3  Median of the economies 
listed.    
4  China, Hong Kong SAR, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand.    
5  Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, 
Mexico, Peru and Venezuela.    
6  Hungary and Poland.    
7  Russia, South Africa and Turkey.  
Sources: Datastream; JPMorgan Chase. 
 
After the collapse of Lehman Brothers in September 2008, global investors reduced their 
exposure to the region amid heightened concerns over counterparty risks.
7 From July 2007 
to August 2009, Asian stock markets fell between 38% and 62%, with the largest market 
declines coming from Singapore (27%), Thailand (21%) and the Philippines (21%).
8 
Meanwhile, sovereign bond spreads peaked in the region as concerns over a slowing global 
economy intensified in the final quarter of 2008. Among the emerging economies in Asia, 
Indonesia experienced the largest increase in spreads, with the Emerging Market Bond Index 
(EMBI)+ spread jumping from 168 basis points (bp) in July 2007 to more than 928 bp in 
                                                  
5   “Recent financial turbulence – course of action”, presented at the 44th SEACEN Governors’ Conference on 
30 January 2009, Bank Negara Malaysia. 
6   Ibid. 
7   Kato, T: “Implications for Asia from the global financial crisis and policy perspectives”, Harvard Asia Business 
Conference, 14–15 February 2009. 
8    Goldstein, M and D Xie, P: “The impact of the financial crisis on emerging Asia”, Peterson Institute for 
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December 2008. On the other hand, China experienced a spread increase of about 270 bp 
from the start of the crisis up to 8 October 2008.
9 
Foreign exchange market 
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1 Nominal effective exchange rate; 2005 = 100.       
2    Annual April survey results; include spots, forwards and swaps.       
3  Weighted 
average of listed economies based on 2005 GDP and PPP exchange rates.       
4    China, Chinese Taipei, Hong Kong SAR, India, 
Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand.    
5  Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico, Peru and Venezuela.    
6  The 
Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland.       
7    Transactions include spots, forwards, and swaps. Japan and Singapore account for 11 
percent of global foreign exchange trading, BIS Triennial Survey 2010. 
Sources: Tokyo Foreign Exchange Market Committee’s Survey of Tokyo FX Market and the Singapore Foreign Exchange Market
Committee Survey of Singapore Foreign Exchange Volume; BIS. 
 
The currencies of emerging Asian countries weakened as investors sought the safe haven of 
the US dollar while a slowdown in world economic growth also limited export earnings of 
member countries. Among the currencies in East Asia, it was the Korean won that 
depreciated the most by end-2008, along with the Indonesian rupiah, the Malaysian ringgit, 
the Philippine peso and the Thai baht, which fell in the range of 4–15% against the US dollar. 
On FX turnover, FX transactions across two major Asian foreign exchange markets, namely 
Tokyo and Singapore, managed to show some increase in volume in 2008. However, by 
April 2009, average monthly FX turnover had declined sharply by around 15.3 percent in 
Tokyo and 22.5 percent in Singapore. The shrinkage in FX swap transactions reflected 
higher risk aversion. Moreover, trade financing tightened in the wake of lower growth 
prospects leading to a further squeeze in the FX markets. 
International bank lending 
Offshore banking in emerging Asia declined as a result of the crisis.
10 From the third quarter 
of 2008, international bank credit flows turned negative in Asia as accelerating losses pushed 
developed economies to reduce their exposure to developing countries.  
                                                  
9   Ibid. 
10  Based on the BIS‘ international banking statistics, loans to developing countries fell from US$ 514 billion in 
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Cross-Border Loans of BIS Reporting Banks
1
2007 2008 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2
Cross-Border Loans  to 
 Developing Countries 514 109 45 -204 -102 -13
           of which: Asia-Pacific 126 -47 -13 -134 -52 3
     
1External loans of BIS reporting banks vis-à-vis individual countries, estimated exchange rate adjusted changes.
Source: Bank for International Settlements
2008 2009
In billions of US dollars
 
The cause of the decline in cross-border bank lending was two-pronged. On the supply side, 
it reflected the virtual drying up of credit following the panic in financial markets. Massive 
deleveraging on the part of international banks, accompanied by the increase in bank losses 
and resurgence of cost savings constrained their credit operations. The Institute of 
International Finance (IIF) noted in its report dated October 2009 that new regulations 
requiring banks to hold high-risk-based levels of capital were expected to prod international 
banks to retrench from emerging market lending. Meanwhile, on the demand side, bank 
lending was also expected to decline due to the limited demand for loans resulting from the 
recession. 
Private sector companies with high levels of external debt due for rollover were particularly 
hard hit by the reduced access to international markets. Creditors were reluctant to rollover 
these debts for fear that borrowers would not be able to service their debts. In addition, 
private borrowers from emerging economies faced the prospect of being “crowded out” by 
the huge borrowing needs of governments to finance fiscal stimulus packages implemented 
to avert a recession in their countries.  
Given this scenario, the corporate sectors in emerging markets faced difficulties in raising 
capital, as they were limited to local borrowing and internally generated funds to meet their 
obligations. In 2009, the corporate sectors from emerging economies needed US$ 200 billion 
to refinance their external debts. The corporate challenges faced by emerging market 
economies (EMEs) included revenue shortfalls, refinancing needs and volatile investor 
sentiment.
11 
III.   Impact on Philippine financial markets 
Like their neighbouring countries in Asia, Philippine financial markets were not spared from 
the ripple effects of the crisis.  
Equity market 
The Philippine equity market came under considerable stress in 2008 amid a deteriorating 
global economic outlook. Concerns over the global financial turmoil and the related 
                                                  
11    See www.rgemonitor.com/22. RGE Monitor: “EM corporates: financing outlook 2009“ (released on 
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slowdown of the global economy resulted in heightened risk aversion and uncertainty, which 
saw investors, both foreign and domestic, either unload their holdings of stocks or stay in the 
sidelines awaiting better news. Subsequently, the ability of the stock market to raise fresh 
capital declined during the year. 
Following the collapse of Lehman Brothers, the benchmark Philippine Stock Exchange Index 
(PSEi) dropped, on 16 September 2008, by 9.3% or 224.3 index points to 2,421.7 from the 
12 September level of 2,646.1 (Table 1). The index had been on a downtrend since early 
September 2008 following reports of the Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae bailouts by the US 
Federal Reserve. The downtrend continued, and on 28 October, the composite index fell to a 
record low of 1,704.41 index points, the lowest level since January 2007. By end-December 
2008, the PSEi had declined by 48.3%, year-on-year, to close at 1,872.85 index points. This 
reflected the movement of equity prices worldwide as risk aversion and uncertainty over the 
earnings of listed firms intensified. 
 
Table 1  Table 2 
Daily Philippine Stock Exchange Index 
January 2007 to December 2009 
Market turnover and volatility 












































Avg. Daily Volume Turnover (In million shares), LHS
Avg. Daily Value Turnover (In PhP million), LHS
Volatility (In index points), RHS
Source: Philippine Stock Exchange  
 
Investor sentiment on the Philippine stock market turned sharply cautious, especially at the 
height of the crisis in 2008. Market capitalisation reached PHP 4.1 trillion at end-2008, nearly 
half of the PHP 8.0 trillion registered in December 2007 (Table 2). Meanwhile, foreign 
investors posted net sales amounting to PHP 22.2 billion in 2008, a reversal of the net buying 
activity of PHP 55.6 billion posted in 2007 (Table 3). The price to earnings (P/E) ratio also 
declined to 9.42 in 2008 from 15.49 in 2007, indicating that investors were expecting lower 
future earnings growth (Table 4). Likewise, market volatility, measured as the standard 
deviation of daily stock indices, nearly doubled to 448 index points in 2008 relative to the 
previous year’s level of 242 index points. 
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Table 3  Table 4 
Net foreign transactions and market 
capitalisation 
January 2007–September 2009 
Price/earnings ratio 
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Source: Philippine Stock Exchange  
 
In the first quarter of 2009, investors’ appetite remained weak amid deepening concerns that 
the global recession would pull down domestically listed firms’ earnings. Withdrawal from the 
equity market continued and net selling reached PHP 7.4 trillion from January to March. The 
composite index closed at 1,986.2 index points at end-March, which was higher by 6.1% on 
the year-to-date level but lower by 33.4% year-on-year. However, starting from the second 
quarter until end-2009, the equity market’s performance improved as investor confidence 
gradually increased, perceiving that the global recession was bottoming out in major 
economies and that the Philippines was generally resilient in withstanding the equity shocks. 
Foreign investors posted a net buying activity of PHP 13.5 billion by end-November 2009, 
while the PSEi composite index closed at 3,052.7 index points at end-December, higher by 
70% relative to the end-2008 level, but lower by 17% compared to the end-2007 level. BIS Papers No 54  323
 
 
Government bond market 
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Government securities (GS), which have been the key feature of the Philippine debt market, 
continued to dominate in 2008, accounting for 89% or PHP 998 billion of the total bond 
issuances in 2008.
12  
Non-residents remained the major holders of the Republic of the Philippine (ROP) bonds, 
holding 58% of the total outstanding issuances as of end-2008. This was, however, lower 
than the previous year’s level of 62%, reflecting heightened investor risk aversion in the 
global market. On the other hand, resident holdings of ROPs increased in 2008, amounting 
to US$ 8.9 billion or 42% of the total outstanding ROPs. Of the total resident ROP holdings, 
Philippine banks accounted for the bulk or 84% (US$ 7.5 billion). Banks were also the 
primary buyers/holders of peso-denominated GS. 
The cost of borrowing funds initially rose in the primary market in 2008. The Bureau of the 
Treasury (BTr) sold less than half its programmed T-bill and fixed-rate Treasury bond (FXTB) 
issuances for the year as it rejected bid rates, which carried high premia caused by rising 
inflation, BSP rate hike concerns and the global financial crisis that exploded in the third 
quarter of the year. The government’s reported comfortable cash position, however, enabled 
the BTr to award bids that it deemed reasonable. Rates of accepted tenders subsequently 
dropped in the fourth quarter as the BSP cut its policy rates in light of the improving inflation 
picture as well as the need to support economic growth. 
In the secondary market, the cost of borrowing funds likewise increased. In the first half of 
2008, investors demanded higher premia for holding government securities as they were 
priced according to lower short-term growth prospects and the possibility of higher inflation in 
the long term. After a brief recovery wherein yields fell in July and August, GS yields rose 
again, starting in September, as investors’ worries intensified with the collapse of major 
investment banks and growing signs of economies going into recession. However, the BSP’s 
measures to provide liquidity to the market starting in the fourth quarter of 2008 helped ease 
the market’s bearishness and caused yields to fall. The deceleration in inflation rates towards 
                                                  
12  Corporate bond issuances comprised the rest of the domestic debt market in 2008 at PHP 125.0 billion, 
capturing 11% of total issuances, an improvement from the 9% share posted in 2007. 324  BIS Papers No 54
 
the end of the year was also a source of optimism as it gave the monetary authorities the 
flexibility to reduce their policy rates which, in turn, led to the easing of GS yields in the 
secondary market.  
In 2009, the downward shift in the yield curve continued with yields dropping faster at the 
shorter end following the monetary easing by the BSP. 
Sovereign spreads 
 
Table 5  Table 6 
JP Morgan EMBI + sovereign bond 
spreads (in basis points) 
January 2007 to December 2009 
Senior five-year CDS spreads  
(in basis points) 
























































Spreads in dollar-denominated ROP bonds have remained on the high side since mid-2008. 
The extra premium for holding Philippine bonds over US Treasuries, as measured by the 
EMBI+ Philippines spread, rose by 335 bp during the year. Sovereign spreads peaked in 
October–November 2008 as depressed risk appetite and associated pressures in developed 
economies spilled over into the emerging financial market. As of 30 June 2009, the EMBI+ 
Global spread narrowed to 424 bp from the average of 481 bp recorded in May 2009. The 
EMBI+ Philippines spread likewise tightened to 323 bp by end-June compared to the 
previous month’s average of 330 bp. By end-December 2009, both the EMBI+ Philippines 
and EMBI+ Global spreads had further narrowed to 198 and 274 bp, respectively (Table 5). 
The trend in the ROP spreads closely followed the CDS spread which significantly swelled to 
825 bp on 24 October 2008 (Table 6).
13 By the end of the year, the Philippine CDS spread 
had retreated to 386 bp. Against neighbouring economies, the Philippine CDS spread 
remained below Indonesia’s CDS level at 691 bp. However, the cost for holding Philippine 
bonds was higher than in Malaysia and Thailand with CDS spreads at 230 bp and 255 bp, 
respectively.  
As of 30 June 2009, the Philippine CDS spread narrowed to 216 bp. This was lower than 
Indonesia’s 310 bp, but remained higher than Malaysia and Thailand with CDS spreads at 
108 and 111 bp, respectively. Relatively weak economic data and corporate earnings reports 
                                                  
13   This means that it costs US$ 825,000 to insure US$ 10.0 million of Philippine sovereign debt from default. BIS Papers No 54  325
 
 
and the resulting expectations of rising defaults contributed to the relatively higher spreads.
14 
However, by end-December 2009, CDS spreads had eased to 173 bp.  
Foreign exchange market 
Against the backdrop of the global financial crisis that was characterised by massive financial 
deleveraging and heightened risk aversion, the peso, like the other regional currencies, 
started to depreciate in March 2008 to an average of PHP 41.25/US$ 1, from PHP 
40.67/US$ 1 in February, particularly following the bailout of Bear Stearns on 14 March 2008. 
The intensification of the financial crisis in September 2008 following the collapse of Lehman 
Brothers and the sharp deterioration in economic prospects in emerging countries led to the 
further depreciation of the peso to an average of PHP 46.69/US$ 1 during the month.  
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The resulting large capital outflows by portfolio investors exerted pressure on the FX market. 
Reflecting the increased demand for dollar liquidity amid the massive capital outflows in 
2008, the average daily volume of transactions in the FX market rose from US$ 583.5 million 
in March to US$ 777.0 million and US$ 876.2 million in September and October 2008, 
respectively. Likewise, the average bid-ask spread quoted in 2008 reflected market strains 
as the spread widened to an average of PHP 0.08 during the year from PHP 0.04 in 2007, 
suggesting increased pressure in dollar liquidity in the FX market following the onset of the 
financial crisis.  
The peso continued to weaken against the US dollar in the last three months of 2008 as risk 
aversion rose further due to market concerns over the contagion effect of the US financial 
turmoil and its impact on the global economy. Volatility, as measured by the coefficient of 
variation, rose from 1.6 in October to 1.8 in December 2008.  
The peso regained stability in 2009 as the Government, together with the monetary 
authorities, implemented several measures to mitigate the impact of the global financial 
crisis. On a year-to-date basis, the peso appreciated against the US dollar by 2.9% to close 
at PHP 46.20/US$ 1 in 2009. In 2009, the average peso-dollar bid-ask spread tightened to 
PHP 0.05, indicating improvements in FX market liquidity. Moreover, the peso’s volatility 
declined to a monthly average of 0.7% in 2009.  
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The developments in the global market during the global financial turmoil were also reflected 
in the interbank transactions in the Philippines. In particular, this was observed in the 
movement of the Philippine Interbank Reference Rate (PHIREF), which is the implied 
Philippine peso interest rate derived from all completed US dollar/peso swap and forward 
transactions.  
The PHIREF for overnight swap transactions declined markedly in the last three months of 
2008, which indicated strong demand for the US dollar as a result of the financial turmoil. 
The demand for dollars rose sharply during this period, such that market participants were 
willing to pay more in terms of pesos (or, conversely, they were willing to receive negative 
returns for their peso funds) just to obtain the required financing in US dollars. This drove the 
PHIREF rate down to zero and then to negative territory.  
On 24 September 2008, for example, the PHIREF for daily overnight swap transactions 
reached –7.55%, the lowest rate in the interbank swap market since the start of the US 
subprime crisis. Moreover, the volume of overnight swap transactions on 24 September 
reached US$ 431.5 million, significantly higher than the US$ 335.7 million in 2008. 
Nonetheless, as market sentiment improved and following several reductions in the BSP’s 
key policy rates, the overnight PHIREF adjusted towards its normal level.
15 In 2009, the 
PHIREF averaged 4.21% while the average daily volume of transactions reached 
US$ 309.9 million. 
Domestic money market  
The money market continued to be generally liquid in 2008 despite the global financial 
turbulence that had escalated during the year. The weighted average interest rate (WAIR) on 
money market transactions declined from 6.1% in 2007 to 5.4% in 2008.
16  
The volume of money market transactions (inclusive of placements with the BSP, interbank 
call loans, interbank swap transactions and Treasury bills) aggregated PHP 84,259 billion in 
2008, 23% higher than the previous year’s level and the highest volume recorded in the last 
nine years. Growth was driven primarily by increased short-term placements with the BSP 
which rose markedly by more than 20% to PHP 76,217 billion. This notable rise in short-term 
placements with the BSP reflected banks’ preference to remain liquid amid generalised risk 
aversion and cautiousness given the challenging economic conditions. It could also be 
explained by the reduced demand for loans because of lower growth prospects. During the 
year, repurchase agreements (RP) were the most actively traded instrument in the money 
market, comprising 75% of the total volume of money market transactions.  
Banks’ placements with the BSP started to grow in April and rose to an average of 
PHP  7,955 billion in July. From August to November, transactions remained elevated, 
averaging PHP 6,634 billion per month.  
                                                  
15  The BSP reduced its policy rates six times from December 2008 given an easing inflation outlook. On 18 
December 2008 and 29 January 2009, the BSP reduced its key policy rates by 50 bp on each occasion while 
on 5 March, 16 April, 28 May, and 7 July 2009, the BSP’s key policy rates were reduced by 25 bp. These 
policy reductions brought the overnight borrowing or reverse repurchase (RRP) facility and the overnight 
lending or repurchase (RP) facility to 4% and 6%, respectively. The decision to reduce the policy rates was 
expected to help bring down the cost of borrowing, thus relieving corporates’ and households’ financial burden 
and promoting wider access to domestic financing amid tight external financing conditions.  
16   The computation for the weighted average interest rates is based on money market transactions on interbank 
call loans, promissory notes, repurchase agreements, commercial papers, Treasury bills and other 
government securities. The sources of basic data used in the analysis/text (unless otherwise stated) come 
from the daily money market reports of banks and other financial institutions with quasi-banking functions 
submitted to the Department of Economic Statistics (DES). BIS Papers No 54  327
 
 
Loans at the interbank call market also increased, rising by 41% to PHP 1,710 billion in 2008. 
The average interest rate in this market dropped to 5.5% during the year compared to the 
7.2% posted in 2007, indicating that banks had sufficient liquidity. 
On a month-on-month basis, however, interbank call loan (IBCL) transactions fell steadily, 
indicating banks’ reluctance to lend. Banks’ cautiousness to lend was likewise reflected in the 
call rates which rose to a peak in August in tandem with the BSP’s earlier tighter monetary 
policy stance to address the build-up of inflationary pressures brought about by the continued 
rise in commodity and oil prices during the latter period of 2007 and the early period of 2008. 
During the first half of 2009, placements in the BSP’s facilities continued to be the preferred 
money market instrument, accounting for 88% of total money market transactions. As for the 
interbank market, the total volume of transactions fell by 62% relative to the same period in 
2008, suggesting that there was sufficient liquidity in the system. 
The continued rise in repo transactions in 2009 indicated that banks remained cautious over 
a possible lengthening of crisis conditions that could drain liquidity in the short-term funding 
market. Banks’ further reluctance to lend to each other, as evidenced partially by the decline 
in interbank lending transactions, as well as the drop in the commercial paper and short-term 
government securities transactions in the secondary market, reflected the persisting elevated 
uncertainties over lending to counterparties other than the government. 
Domestic banking 
The Philippine banking system
17 has remained resilient despite the heightened level of global 
financial distress. This is primarily due to several factors: first, the limited exposure of 
domestic banks to the US subprime fallout and other related securitised assets, which 
accounted for only 0.4% of the banking system’s total assets as of 30 June 2008; second, its 
relatively strong bank balance sheets with a return to profitability; third, improvements in risk 
and liquidity management; fourth, strengthening of supervisory and regulatory systems; and 
fifth, moves by banks into more profitable domestic business lines such as consumer 
lending.
18  
In fact, in the first half of 2009, local banks managed to register respectable growth in their 
key balance sheet accounts. During the period, banks were able to provide higher provisions 
for credit losses, plough back undivided profits to reinforce their capital base and achieve 
greater efficiency in their operations on account of greater maximisation of e-banking 
technologies. Philippine banks recorded solid performances in terms of asset quality, capital 
position and profitability. Overall, the system was able to maintain net profit despite the 
decline in treasury-related operations due to substantial revaluations of unrealised gains from 
banks’ FX transactions.  
Funding 
Prior to the crisis, the domestic banking system was focused on the traditional banking 
business of accepting deposits and making loans. In addition, banks’ composite asset and 
funding mix were mainly domestic-oriented. The prudential measures put in place after the 
Asian crisis (geared towards maintaining a strong banking system, strengthening bank 
                                                  
17   For the purposes of this paper, the Philippine banking system refers to the Philippine universal and 
commercial banking system (UKBs), unless otherwise specified. The UKBs accounts for the bulk (89.5%) of 
total resources of the Philippine banking system as of the fourth quarter of 2008, and generally drives 
developments for the whole system. 
18   “Ímpact of the global financial and economic crisis on the Philippines”, J T Yap et al. 328  BIS Papers No 54
 
balance sheets, promoting corporate governance and transparency, upgrading risk 
management standards and improving consumer protection) helped to curb excessive risk-
taking of domestic banks. These factors helped to insulate them to a considerable degree 
from the negative impact brought about by the credit crisis. 
Deposits have remained the main funding source of banks, making up more than 82% of 
total liabilities as of end-September 2009 from 83% for the whole year of 2008. Meanwhile, 
retail deposits made up more than half of total deposits at 56%. 
Meanwhile, in response to heightened concerns over liquidity, domestic banks increased 
their reliance on short-term funding (with maturities of up to one year) in 2009. From 86% in 
September 2008, the share of short-term funding to total funding increased to 89% in 
September 2009. In contrast, the share of long-term funding (with maturities over five years) 
to total funding decreased to 5% from 10% in the same period.  
Lending 
Even amid the global financial crisis, the total loan portfolio of the domestic banking system 
grew by 7.7% and 1.4% in the third quarter of 2009 year-on-year and quarter-on-quarter, 
respectively. In the same period, loans to the corporate sector grew by 19.2% relative to the 
level of the previous year. Likewise, total loans to the household sector grew modestly by 
0.6% compared to the third quarter level of 2008. As of June 2009, loans to the corporate 
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Since 2007, the proportion of corporate sector loans in the banking system’s loan portfolio 
declined from a high of 67% immediately after the Asian crisis to a low of 49% in 2007, as 
excess production capacity dimmed the appetite for corporate borrowing. The proportion of 
such loans partially recovered at 61% as of June 2009. Besides financial intermediation and 
the interbank market, the top three loan recipients were real estate, manufacturing and 
agriculture-related sectors. Meanwhile, the proportion of household loans to total loans 
likewise showed a general downtrend during the same period.  
Similarly, there were some changes in banks’ loan structure in terms of the types of maturity 
issued and profile of counterparties transacted with. In terms of maturity, the proportion of 
short-term lending (with maturities of up to one year) to total lending declined from 72% as of BIS Papers No 54  329
 
 
end-June 2008 to only 61% as of end-September 2009, indicating the shift of banks’ lending 
activities to longer-term maturities in the face of the uncertain environment during the period.  
Asset quality 
 
Capital adequacy ratio (CAR) 
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In 2009, the banking system’s capital adequacy ratio (CAR) remained above regulatory and 
international standards at 14.8% on a solo basis and 15.6% on a consolidated basis. This 
indicates that local banks had adequate capital buffers to absorb potential losses. 
In the first half of 2009, non-performing loans (NPLs) decreased by 10.0% from 
PHP 94.1 billion in the previous year to PHP 84.6 billion. This consequently brought down 
the banking system’s NPL ratio to its eleven and a half-year low of 3.4%. As a corollary, non-
performing assets (NPAs) decreased by 5.9% in the same period at PHP 225.5 billion from 
PHP 239.7 billion in the previous year. Both NPL and NPA ratios further eased to 3.37% and 
4.16% respectively by end-October 2009. 
Lastly, total resources of the banking system rose by 7.2% to PHP 6.1 trillion as of end-
October 2009 from the previous year level of PHP 5.7 trillion. The increase was mainly due 
to the rise in debt securities. U/KBs continued to account for almost 90% of the total 
resources of the banking system. 
Profitability 
The banking system’s profitability improved during the first quarter of 2009. Net income after 
tax (NIAT) was at PHP 14 billion, reflecting an increase of 101% and 5% compared to the 
previous quarter and a year ago levels, respectively. The increase in NIAT could be 
attributed to the decline in the cost-to-income (CTI) ratio at 66% in end-March relative to 69% 
in the previous quarter and 70% in the previous year. The decline in CTI was driven by the 
reduction in compensation/fringe benefits and other administrative expenses. 
Meanwhile, return on equity (ROE) and return on assets (ROA) increased to 8.13% and 
0.90% in the first three months of 2009 from 6.86% and 0.78%, respectively, in the previous 
quarter. 330  BIS Papers No 54
 
 
Return on assets (ROA)/return on equity 
(ROE) 
Jan 2001 – June 2009 
Volatility of annual growth rates of 
profitability 


























Liquidity, next to capital adequacy, is key to financial stability. The reduction in reserve 
requirements (19% of peso deposit liabilities/substitutes effective 14 November 2008 
pursuant to Circular no 632 dated 13 November 2008) and prudent credit allocation (loan-to-
deposit ratio stood at 63.0% as of end-September 2009) of banks led to ample liquidity in the 
system. Parallel to this, the BSP implemented other liquidity management measures to 
ensure liquidity in the system (ie peso and dollar repo windows). 
The ratio of banks’ liquid assets to total assets increased to 30.6% as of end-September 
2009 from the previous year’s ratio of 29.7%. Investment in government securities and 
amounts due from banks comprised total liquid assets at 53% and 41%, respectively. The 
loan-to-deposit ratio remained modest at 63.0%. Excluding lending to and deposits from 
banks, the loan-to-deposit ratio was even lower at 47.0%. 
Foreign banks 
While domestic banks registered positive growth in assets, loans and liabilities, foreign-
owned banks suffered a general decline in their balance sheets. Foreign-owned banks’ 
assets plummeted by 12.0%, loans by 15.0% and liabilities by 13.0% year-on-year as of 
September 2009.  
It would seem that foreign banks were still risk-averse regarding the financial markets, since 
94% of the decline in their loan portfolio was accounted for by the drop in their interbank 
loans (IBL) and repurchase (repo) activities. It should be noted that foreign banks are 
significant players in the IBL and repo markets, accounting for 31% and 24% of the total of 
these markets (this is quite large given that foreign banks only account for around 13% of 
banks’ total assets). The decline in total IBLs can be attributed mainly to one foreign bank’s 
IBL transactions, which decreased by PHP 21.6 billion. 
This was in sharp contrast to the IBL and repo activities of domestic banks, which increased 
by 45% and 71%, respectively. Domestic banks appeared to regain their confidence in the 
financial markets sooner than foreign banks (domestic banks' IBLs dropped in 2008 and 
early 2009). This was expected given the vulnerability of foreign banks' head offices. BIS Papers No 54  331
 
 
Foreign-owned banks’ loan portfolios remained the bulk of their assets. As of September 
2009, their loan portfolio share to total assets was 57%, 10 percentage points higher than 
that of domestic banks. The contraction in foreign-owned banks’ loan portfolios offset the 
50% growth in their investment portfolios, which comprised 15% of total assets in the same 
period. Investments in government securities comprised 68% of total investments. 
Meanwhile, domestic banks’ investment portfolios, which made up 29% of their total assets, 
grew by 25%. 
Like domestic banks, deposits have remained the core source of foreign-owned banks’ 
funding. As a share of total liabilities, deposits of foreign-owned banks went up from 58% in 
September 2008 to 65% in September 2009. 
Foreign-owned banks posted an increase in their liquidity ratio from 23.4% in September 
2008 to 27.0% in September 2009, due mainly to the 12% decline in their total assets. Liquid 
assets per se increased by only 1%. This ratio, however, was lower than domestic banks’ 
liquidity ratio at 31%. 
IV.   The BSP’s response to the crisis 
In response to the global financial turmoil, the BSP carefully considered opportunities for 
monetary policy easing amid the potential tightening of financial conditions while remaining 
faithful to its core mandate of maintaining price stability. The BSP pursued policies that would 
infuse appropriate levels of liquidity to maintain the efficient functioning of the financial 
markets and help avert the shrinkage of domestic markets while keeping its eye on price 
developments. 
Because the Philippine economy did not experience as deep a crisis as the advanced 
economies, monetary easing by the BSP was of a relatively smaller magnitude and thus 
involved conventional measures. 
In many ways, the BSP’s interest rate easing and liquidity provision measures were 
confidence-building moves, signalling the BSP’s commitment to ensuring ample money 
supply in order to fuel the economy’s growth engine and maintaining low interest rates to 
reduce the cost of borrowing to firms and households and therefore support investment and 
consumption growth. 
Policy rate reduction  
With easing price pressures due to muted demand pressures, the BSP moved to cut policy 
rates by 200 bp from December 2008, bringing the overnight borrowing or reverse 
repurchase rate to 4.0% and the overnight lending or repurchase rate to 6.0%. The rate 
reductions were intended to help stimulate economic growth and/or dampen the slowdown in 
economic activity by reducing the cost of borrowing, thereby reducing the financial burden of 
firms and households. Reduced policy rates also helped to mitigate the negative feedback 
loop between weakening economic conditions and a more cautious financial sector. The 
action also helped to boost business and consumer confidence.  332  BIS Papers No 54
 
Policy rate reductions 
18 December 2008  50 bp reduction 
29 January 2009  50 bp reduction 
5 March 2009  25 bp reduction 
16 April 2009  25 bp reduction 
28 May 2009  25 bp reduction 
7 July 2009  25 bp reduction 
 
Liquidity-enhancing measures 
With the growing concern that local banks could encounter problems in sourcing dollars, the 
BSP implemented several measures to help infuse dollar liquidity into the domestic financial 
system. The BSP opened a US dollar repo facility to augment dollar liquidity in the FX market 
and ensure the ready availability of credit for imports and other legitimate funding 
requirements. For this facility, the Monetary Board (MB) approved the use of foreign-
denominated sovereign debt securities (ROP) as collateral for loan availments. The 
guidelines were amended the following month to limit the facility only to banks with legitimate 
foreign currency-denominated funding needs, provided that the borrowing would be for the 
account of the applicant bank and would not be used to fund the liquidity requirements of 
foreign branches, affiliates or subsidiaries.  
In addition to the foreign currency refinancing measures, the BSP implemented the following 
liquidity support measures for the purpose of pre-emptively providing ample liquidity and 
credit in the banking system:  
 
Other liquidity support measures 
7 November 2008  Increased the rediscounting budget from P20B to P40B 
14 November 2008  Reduced the reserve requirement by two percentage points 
2 March 2009  Increased further the rediscounting budget from P40B to P60B. A larger 
rediscounting budget would enable banks to refinance more loans extended 
to their clients 
  Liberalised rediscounting guidelines to enable banks to rediscount more loan 
papers and therefore have access to additional funds that they could relend 
to the public. These included: 
  Aligning the peso rediscount rate with the BSP’s RRP rate, less 50 basis 
points. 
  Increasing the loan value of all eligible rediscounting papers from 80% to 
90% of the outstanding balance of a borrowing bank’s credit instrument. 
  Lifting the requirement to execute a Surety Agreement (SA) by any single 
stockholder, natural or juridical, owning more than 50% of the voting 
stocks of a bank with approved rediscounting lines with the BSP. 
  Lifting the imposition of a ceiling on the outstanding papers that a bank 
may rediscount equal to the rediscounting bank’s single borrower’s limit. 
  Easing the NPL ratio requirement. 
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Lastly, the BSP launched the Credit Surety Fund Programme (CSFP) in the second half of 
2008 to help ensure that small businesses had access to financing. The CSFP is a credit 
enhancement scheme that allows micro, small and medium enterprises (MSMEs) that are 
members of cooperatives to borrow from banks even without collateral. Loans granted by 
banks under the Programme are eligible for rediscounting with the BSP through the 
Department of Loans and Credit (DLC). 
Regulatory forbearance 
Complementing the aforementioned measures, the BSP also responded to the global 
financial crisis with regulatory forbearance. To safeguard confidence in the banking system, 
on 30 October 2008 the Monetary Board approved the guidelines allowing financial 
institutions to reclassify financial assets from categories measured at fair value to those 
measured at amortised cost. Financial institutions were allowed to reclassify their 
investments in debt and equity securities from their “held for trading” or “available for sale” 
categories to the “held to maturity” or the “unquoted debt securities classified as loans” 
categories. Likewise, the maximum deposit insurance coverage was increased to 
PHP 500,000 from PHP 250,000. 
Cooperation and communication 
Lastly, in response to the BSP’s call for a coordinated domestic response to the global 
financial turmoil, the Bankers’ Association of the Philippines (BAP) adopted several 
measures by way of a gentlemen’s agreement at end-October 2008. For example, banks 
agreed to voluntarily halve their purchases or “overbought” position in the FX market to 
US$ 25 million (or 10% of unimpaired capital) from the prevailing US$ 50 million (or 20% of 
unimpaired capital), which helped to ease pressure on the demand for dollars. Moreover, the 
BSP further strengthened engagements with regional peers to share information, discuss 
emerging developments and pool resources, if necessary – even FX reserves.  
In responding to the crisis, the BSP also found it important to improve transparency and 
communicate its near-term policy objectives. Communicating to the market and the public 
that the BSP is committed to ensuring that there is ample liquidity to keep the financial 
markets functioning and to helping fund the growth requirements of the economy has helped 
to stabilise financial markets and anchor inflation expectations going forward. Markets have, 
for instance, reacted positively to monetary policy actions that reassure them of the BSP’s 
commitment to keeping inflation in check. Clear communication will also avoid confusion 
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V.   Effectiveness of the BSP’s policy response 
Selected economic and financial indicators 
 
  2007 2008 2009 
Real GDP growth (%)   7.1  3.8  1.1 
Headline inflation (%)  2.8  9.3  3.2 
Domestic liquidity, M3        
 In billions of pesos  3,174.4  3,668.4  3,971.5 
8.3 
 (%)  10.6  15.6  12.0 
Bank average lending rates (%)  8.7  8.8  8.5 
T-bills 91 days (%)  3.4  5.4  4.2 
Outstanding loans of universal 
and commercial banks, net of 
RRPs (in billions of pesos)  1,618.6 1,907.3 2,098.3 
 (%)  8.3  17.8  10.0 
End-of-period exchange rate 
(Peso/US$  1)  41.28 47.52 46.20 
Balance of payments        
 In billions of USD  8.6  0.1  5.3 
Current account        
 In billions of USD  7.2  3.9  8.6 
 As a percentage of GDP (%)  4.9  2.3  5.3 
Gross international reserves       
 In billions of USD  33.8  37.6  44.2 
 Months of imports  5.7  5.9  9.0 
 
Evidence suggests that the BSP’s policy responses have proven to be effective. 
Reduced policy rates boosted business and consumer confidence for economic expansion. 
As a result, real GDP continued to grow, albeit slower, at 1.1 % for 2009. Year-on-year 
growth can be traced to personal consumption expenditure and general government 
expenditure.  
Year-on-year headline inflation averaged 3.2% for the whole of 2009, well within the 
Government’s target range of 2.5–4.5% for the year. The subdued inflation environment has 
allowed the BSP to reduce its policy rates to support the economy. 
Market interest rates have trended downwards following the policy rate cuts by the BSP, as 
banks have passed on reduced lending rates to their borrowers. The average bank lending 
rates for all maturities for 2009 averaged 8.5% from 8.8% in 2008. The average interest rate 
for the 91-day T-bill rate went down to 4.2% from 5.4% in 2008. 
Sustained liquidity growth was recorded in 2009, indicating that ample funds were available 
to support the credit needs of firms and households. Domestic liquidity grew steadily at 8.3% 
year-on-year in 2009. BIS Papers No 54  335
 
 
Outstanding bank lending as of December 2009, net of banks’ reverse repurchase 
placements with the BSP, continued to grow by 10% year-on-year. Loans for production 
activities expanded year-on-year by 9.9% in December. 
The peso-dollar exchange rate has remained generally steady. On a year-to-date basis, the 
peso appreciated by 2.9% against the US dollar as it closed at PHP 46.20/US$ 1, on 29 
December 2009. The peso strengthened due to the increased risk appetite for emerging 
market assets and continued inflows of OF remittances. 
The overall BOP posted a surplus of US$ 5.3 billion in 2009 on the strength of an improved 
current account balance. This resulted in the build-up of the country’s gross international 
reserves (GIR), which reached US$ 44.2 billion, equivalent to 9.0 times the country’s imports 
of goods and services. 336  BIS Papers No 54
 





































Source: Philippine Stock Exchange (PSE)
   Philippine Daily Stock Composite Index
   2007 to 2009 
   (end of period)





   STOCK MARKET CAPITALISATION 
 1
Financials Industrial Holding Firms       Services Property Mining & Oil SME  Total
2007 Jan 4,429,614.13 762,381.44 698,783.15 944,644.71 534,461.91 67,475.28 322.68 7,437,683.29
Feb 4,492,380.32 788,248.32 654,902.47 890,486.84 535,920.50 70,841.59 335.28 7,433,115.32
Mar  4,554,201.89 802,566.61 679,770.78 923,985.21 562,832.09 80,249.68 300.28 7,603,906.55
Apr  4,627,118.47 810,929.61 699,621.08 934,578.98 577,595.28 87,844.97 325.48 7,738,013.87
May  4,654,013.88 858,471.82 790,855.12 966,161.01 642,006.26 98,786.27 364.68 8,010,659.04
Jun 4,721,304.22 907,382.85 839,617.81 988,172.77 771,977.12 97,752.11 342.28 8,326,549.17
Jul  4,525,377.09 907,414.92 824,962.33 1,017,014.94 744,075.45 101,532.93 473.76 8,120,851.34
Aug  4,614,380.62 889,202.58 757,637.65 1,025,498.37 670,340.91 91,473.24 13,791.91 8,062,325.28
Sep 4,686,128.15 863,168.12 792,615.89 1,093,661.32 679,198.92 109,616.89 17,706.61 8,242,095.89
Oct  5,062,323.45 897,663.46 856,838.94 1,160,267.12 703,781.14 120,311.53 12,082.61 8,813,268.25
Nov  4,499,508.22 810,899.02 770,988.07 1,138,511.05 635,575.34 115,961.06 4,370.09 7,975,812.86
Dec  4,395,322.87 861,904.18 793,275.75 1,146,800.86 638,256.04 122,320.49 4,509.43 7,962,399.62
2008
Jan 3,882,841.31 769,339.87 672,306.73 1,069,857.82 572,377.76 105,911.04 2,973.28 7,075,607.82
Feb 4,045,855.79 779,939.09 647,194.80 1,041,518.30 518,692.71 110,284.15 3,047.90 7,146,532.74
Mar  3,794,323.45 738,969.06 608,321.32 1,015,826.66 473,115.94 105,753.69 2,868.56 6,739,178.68
Apr  4,065,506.37 721,037.12 559,053.84 944,290.27 432,955.45 101,109.93 2,967.56 6,826,920.53
May  4,178,254.30 799,704.86 585,867.69 958,264.56 452,117.92 109,192.25 2,878.21 7,086,279.79
Jun 3,773,537.41 752,396.43 510,276.59 892,387.19 386,759.62 98,981.49 3,218.25 6,417,556.97
Jul 3,762,959.15 780,191.91 536,039.80 908,183.50 394,710.76 97,852.86 3,173.48 6,483,111.46
Aug  3,583,045.20 791,106.70 580,575.91 949,090.98 423,368.35 100,148.74 2,716.98 6,430,052.86
Sep 3,710,188.11 855,182.82 481,583.42 958,267.03 417,062.87 84,497.79 2,331.66 6,509,113.69
Oct 2,656,212.86 706,803.19 349,653.86 743,731.83 322,782.86 54,880.57 1,699.36 4,835,764.53
Nov  2,207,099.00 648,048.01 314,831.75 812,541.14 307,269.26 52,673.08 1,328.91 4,343,790.95
Dec  2,000,833.70 631,743.85 326,037.48 738,512.44 319,220.55 50,652.42 2,226.28 4,069,226.70
2009
Jan 2,069,172.04 657,815.79 327,497.33 736,839.43 310,137.67 53,216.19 1,546.53 4,156,224.99
Feb 1,937,366.97 710,256.98 327,259.19 746,493.00 296,596.66 56,566.90 1,550.35 4,076,090.05
Mar  1,733,749.03 765,267.25 345,839.82 793,354.33 299,653.94 59,720.67 1,550.35 3,999,135.38
Apr  2,072,093.99 781,503.27 393,805.45 791,051.17 364,305.26 59,974.88 1,645.87 4,464,379.90
May  2,321,772.71 858,348.15 581,478.05 865,727.94 397,742.66 81,820.97 2,094.55 5,108,985.03
Jun 2,409,080.24 906,873.75 530,622.45 894,179.14 389,327.77 83,132.51 341.52 5,213,557.38
Jul  2,897,835.35 1,055,562.87 606,293.72 962,376.66 455,961.57 94,655.17 341.52 6,073,026.85
Aug  2,799,579.58 1,051,844.19 641,303.46 977,218.87 509,235.60 111,406.48 341.52 6,090,929.69
Sep 2,697,591.63 1,013,625.57 603,538.86 964,922.37 504,235.93 123,783.52 1,023.52 5,908,721.39
Oct  2,608,186.21 1,015,427.67 616,859.90 967,462.50 486,673.72 152,102.29 836.71 5,847,548.99
Nov  2,477,699.79 1,068,549.90 622,505.91 979,039.09 498,920.60 194,944.04 332.33 5,841,991.67
Dec  2,603,594.14 1,109,753.24 632,024.01 996,670.43 499,477.05 187,227.43 335.44 6,029,081.74
    1 As of January 31, 2006 new sector classification was implemented.
Source of data:  Philippine Stock Exchange (PSE)
  2006-2009
  end of period 
  in million pesos338  BIS Papers No 54
 
TABLE 3
PSE Foreign Transactions Value, 2007 -  2009
(in Philippine Pesos, current prices)
Foreign Buying Foreign Selling Net Foreign Transactions
2007 Jan 54624482460.52 42799836584.00 11824645876.52
Feb 60348568452.96 57685291927.79 2663276525.17
Mar 57764292641.44 44942845215.13 12821447426.31
Apr 42423483237.04 35977257317.38 6446225919.66
May 65152113300.33 52344613055.95 12807500244.38
Jun 78117861385.16 60281672927.28 17836188457.88
Jul 88773900947.40 74311396231.55 14462504715.85
Aug 61280748349.08 63712137319.42 -2431388970.34
Sep 43591533123.61 47823694669.05 -4232161545.44
Oct 50456675289.31 50399856496.89 56818792.42
Nov 43935164107.63 52475885636.91 -8540721529.28
Dec 33858361421.76 42004476071.56 -8146114649.80
Total 680327184716.24 624758963452.91 55568221263.33
2008 Jan 33861538532.55 45760706791.30 -11899168258.75
Feb 31691841444.11 33393265845.17 -1701424401.06
Mar 27373456180.72 30484718546.94 -3111262366.22
Apr 26164040548.26 30554343562.43 -4390303014.17
May 36473471424.88 34191071678.34 2282399746.54
Jun 30043182716.40 26397603083.67 3645579632.73
Jul 53207922751.70 52793292084.20 414630667.50
Aug 17348560925.64 22518299949.34 -14759547993.43
Sep 21888434612.93 28630403453.08 -6741968840.15
Oct 22755088855.15 32564915725.78 -9809826870.63
Nov 21541270239.59 18425057936.11 3116212303.48
Dec 38663920067.63 27457672938.48 11206247129.15
Total 361012728299.56 383171351594.84 -22158623295.28
2009 Jan 11411151991.89 13854622160.43 -2443470168.54
Feb 15118606687.18 13803356445.37 1315250241.81
Mar 19393219617.80 25634925928.37 -6241706310.57
Apr 43402464010.67 26540437959.92 16862026050.75
May 62937270762.98 64826112157.08 -1888841394.10
Jun 25461857519.60 24776139494.84 685718024.76
Jul 26173450243.72 26626967169.41 -453516925.69
Aug 20417010612.13 21700958689.54 -1283948077.41
Sep 31614603245.50 21692011565.04 9922591680.46
Total 255929634691.47 239455531570.00 16474103121.47
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TABLE 5 
JP Morgan EMBI+Sovereign Bond Spreads
(End-month period, In basis points)
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Table 6. Senior 5-Year CDS Spreads
(End-month period, In basis points)
Philippines Indonesia Thailand Malaysia
31-Jan-07 121.328                  119.600               35.989               18.133                 
28-Feb-07 123.097                  123.450               41.108               18.000                 
30-Mar-07 120.476                  119.665               41.514               17.055                 
30-Apr-07 108.100                  106.990               37.350               13.000                 
31-May-07 100.643                  99.400                 37.929               14.257                 
29-Jun-07 110.675                  110.260               38.314               16.225                 
31-Jul-07 206.300                  208.900               59.150               36.160                 
31-Aug-07 180.799                  181.940               62.233               37.365                 
28-Sep-07 143.056                  141.264               43.099               24.497                 
31-Oct-07 132.401                  125.563               41.990               23.926                 
30-Nov-07 159.634                  159.003               62.472               45.431                 
31-Dec-07 153.335                  152.830               54.833               41.993                 
31-Jan-08 209.794                  211.827               89.637               72.332                 
29-Feb-08 241.726                  240.041               102.087             82.959                 
31-Mar-08 240.421                  245.033               110.432             98.500                 
30-Apr-08 195.099                  224.997               69.797               65.627                 
30-May-08 223.208                  250.404               80.038               77.244                 
30-Jun-08 261.647                  281.647               132.254             111.914               
31-Jul-08 222.495                  241.774               105.888             97.759                 
29-Aug-08 242.769                  261.299               135.000             127.505               
30-Sep-08 286.383                  360.177               169.934             168.325               
31-Oct-08 482.575                  564.454               189.364             167.199               
28-Nov-08 417.657                  773.845               334.447             310.825               
31-Dec-08 386.213                  691.364               255.264             230.058               
30-Jan-09 379.925                  604.868               238.771             231.320               
27-Feb-09 446.650                  642.947               295.356             296.389               
31-Mar-09 378.300                  573.225               242.488             240.850               
30-Apr-09 294.63 402.975 187.324 176.7
29-May-09 229.175 333.037 121.682 115.99
30-Jun-09 216.422 310.482 110.698 108.452
31-Jul-09 178.961 199.163 79.832 75.99
31-Aug-09 188.652 213.683 93.973 96.998
29-Sep-09 178.558 186.469 88.524 83.992
30-Oct-09 179.308 191.173 100.129 94.616
30-Nov-09 191.461 229.475 111.004 110.74
31-Dec-09 173.067 192.007 94.6 88.372







































Source: Reference Exchange Rate Bulletin, Treasury Department, BSP
Peso Per U.S. Dollar Rate
2007 to 2009 
(Monthly Average)
 